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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an interpleader action by plaintiff, WHEREIN plaintiff 
tendered into court the amount of $31,635.29, and wherein the Defendants-
Respondents, E. Odell Summers and Orval E. Petersen, and the Defendant-
Appellant, Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives claimed an interest in the 
money tendered. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Berkeley Bank's Motions for a Directed Verdict and for Judgment N~t­
withstanding the Verdict were denied, and the jury entered a verdict in 
favor of the Defendants-Respondents, E. Odell Summers and Orval E. Peter-
sen, and the court entered a Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law, in accordance therewith. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant, Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives, seeks a re-
versal of the trial court judgment and for judgment in its favor, as a 
matter of law, to the effect that its security interest in the Defendant 
Dairymen Associates' accounts receivable, entitles it to the monies ten-
dered into court by the plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant-Appellant, Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives, (herein-
after Berkeley Bank) is a corporation, incorporated under the laws of 
the United states of America. on March 26, 1975, the defendant, Dairy-
illen Associates, Inc., (hereinafter Dairymen) DBA Heber Valley Milk Co· 
~ s in the amounts of delivered to Berkeley Bank, two promissory no~e 
SJ3,J,JOO.OO (EX. 9) and $180,000.00 (EX. 10) both payable to Berkeley 
~an<. Dalr:men defaulted on these notes and subsequently filed Bank-
-J_-
-
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ruptcy in the United States District Court for the District of Utah 
' 1 Se 
central Division, on or about January 17, 1976. (T. 55). , 
I 
we 
As security for the payment of these notes, Dairymen executed ana 
delivered to Berkeley Bank a security agreement (EX.ll) wherein Dair;·i ag 
men granted to Berkeley Bank a security interest in personal property I tr 
of Dairymen, including a security interest in "all of debtor's accoun1 th (as the term is defined in the Utah Uniform Commercial Code) presentl!j me 
existing or hereafter arising, including but not limited to accounts rj Nc 
ceivable." (EX.ll) Berkeley Bank perfected its security interest inai~ se 
"accounts" including accounts receivable by filing with the Secretary~ th 
State on February 21, 1975, a financing statement (EX.l2) as required~ ar 
the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. Nc 
The defendant, Dairymen Associates, Inc. was an agriculture co-~ 0, 
operative having been accepted as such by the United States Departmen: ac 
of Agriculture on or about March 1, 1974 (T.38). Dairymen had specii;j p1 
authority from its Board of Directors to enter into the loan with 
Berkeley Bank. (T.38). 
The purpose of this cooperative •.vas to market milk for producer; A 
(dairy farmers) ·.vithout being subject to federal price controls. (?) Cl 
I 
The Defendants-Respondents, E. Odell Summers and Orval E. Petersen,·d c: 
producers for Dairymen Associates and received checks directly from d 
men for their milk which was produced for the cooperative. They rec;.l 
checks from Dairymen until November of 1975, after which Dairymen teO 
nated doing business and filed Bankruptcy in January, 1976. Both ·.;r. D 
Summers and Hr. Petersen received payment for their milk directly fr:· o 
Dairymen. However, checks payable to 0<\r. Summers and r·lr. Petersen-
-2-
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september, October and November, 1975, failed to clear the bank and 
' were returned for insufficient funds. J 
I 
:;·I 
:y I 
Jn:l 
tl)j 
5(1 
aij 
Mr. Summers and Mr. Petersen thereafter filed separate lawsuits 
against Dairymen in Weber County. Copies of the complaints were in-
troduced at trial as Exhibits 14 and 28. Except for the amounts claimed, 
these complaints are identical. Both Summers and Petersen allege Dairy-
men owed them money for milk delivered to Dairymen between September and 
November, 1975. As a separate cause of action, both Summers and Peter-
sen asked that Gossner Cheese Co. be restrained from paying Dairymen for 
ry ~ their milk which was delivered through Dairymen Associates, Inc. Summers 
and Petersen prayed for judgment against Dairymen for the amounts owed. 
No allegations were made that Gessner Cheese Co. or Edwin 0. Gossner 
owed them any money for this milk. In fact, any claims of Respondents 
against Gessner Cheese Co. and Edwin 0. Gessner, were dismissed with 
prejudice by stipulation of the Respondents. (EX. 17, 20&31). 
Thereafter, judgments by default were entered against Dairymen 
Associates in the amounts prayed on December 5, 1975. (EX.l5 and 29). 
:r; Also on December 5, 1975, \"'rits of Garnishment were issued to Gessner 
Cheese Company. (EX.l6 and 30). These writs were served on Gessner 
, ·,\:0 Cheese Co. on December 16, 1975. 
In its Answers to Interrogatories to Garnishee, Gessner Cheese Co. 
ec;.l stated that Gessner Cheese co. was not indebted to Dairymen Associates, 
ter:l but that Edwin o. Gessner in his individual capacity was indebted to 
~r. Da1rymen Associates in the amount of $31,635.29 for milk supplied to 
fr:· edwin .J. Gessner by Dairymen. 
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Berkeley Bank notified Gessner that it had a security interest 
in Dairymen's accounts receivable and requested 
money owed to Dairymen directly to them, (R.4). 
that Gessner pay the i 
I Because of these con-[ 
flicting claims between Berkeley Bank and Summers & Petersen (by virtue\ 
of their Writs of Garnishments), Edwin o. Gessner filed a complaint b 
interpleader against Berkeley Bank, Dairymen and summers and Petersen 
dated December 31, 1975. (R.03), wherein he admitted owing the sum of 
$31,635.29 for milk he purchased from Dairymen Associates, Inc. (~0~1 
(T.l35-136). I I 
Dairymen sent statements to Gessner for milk delivered in October! 
and November, 1975. (EX.5 and 6). These statements were for milk de-l 
I 
livered to Gassner by Dairymen Associates for the last 15 days of / 
October and the first 15 days of November, 1975 (T.44). The amount I 
tendered into court by Gessner is based on these two statements (T-llt! 
The total due for both bills was $32,410.79. Mr. Gassner had two in-\ 
sufficient funds checks from Dairymen in the amount of $355.14 a~ I 
$420.36 or a total of $775.50. This amount was subtracted from the 
toal due of $32,410.79 for a net amount owed to Dairymen of S31.63S.ii, 
! 
which is the amount tendered by Mr. Gassner. (T.l36). 
On or about January 19, 1976, Dairymen filed Bankruptcy (T.551 d 
listed both Summers and Petersen on Bankruptcy Schedule A-3 as credtt:1 
of Dairymen having unsecured claims. (EX. 7 and 3). 
-.:!-
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st 
I 
the I 
I 
COn· I 
virtue\ 
rsen 
m of 
R.OII I 
I 
:tober I 
: de· I 
I 
I 
mt I 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MO-
TIONS FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AND FOR JUDGMENT NOT-
WITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR 
A NEW TRIAL. 
At the close of the evidence Appellant's counsel moved the Court 
for a directed verdict in its favor on the basis that the Respondents 
failed to meet their respective burdens of proof (T.207) and upon the 
fact that issues raised at this trial were res judicata. (T. 210). The 
Court would not hear this motion until after he instructed the jury 
and sent them to deliberate (T.206), and thereafter denied the motion 
(T.210). The court thereafter entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment on November 28, 1977. The Appellant filed its 
Motions for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and for a New Trial on 
(T-llt I 
: December 7, 1977. (R.239). The Court denied these motions and entered 
) in- \ 
the 
63S.ii, 
! 
55) d 
redtt:1 
a Memorandum Decision January 17, 1978, (R.267) and an Order Denying 
Appellants' Motions on January 27, 1978. (R. 268). The trial court erred 
tn denying these motions for the following reasons: 
POINT IA 
THE MONEY TENDERED INTO COURT BY THE 
PLAINTIFF 1-JAS MONEY OWED TO DAIRYMEN 
ASSOCIATES, INC., AND WAS AN ACCOUNTS 
RECEIVABLE OF DAIRYMEN ASSOCIATES, INC. 
AS A MATTER OF LA\-J, IN WHICH APPELLANT 
HAS A PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST SUPE-
RIOR TO ANY CLAIM OF THE RESPONDENTS. 
serkeley Bank's burden of proof in this case was to prove that it 
had a valid security agreement in Dairymen's accounts receivable and 
that the ~oney tendered into court by the plaintiff was owed to Dairymen 
-5-
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for milk delivered through Dairymen to Gassner. The Appellant met 
this burden of proof by uncontradicted evidence i.e. (1) the notes 
executed by Dairymen to Appellant (EX.9 & 10, T.l46); (2) the securit-· 
Jl 
agreement wherein Dairymen granted to Berkeley Bank a security interest' 
I 
in all of Dairymen's accounts receivable (EX.ll, T.l46); (3) the fi-
nancing statement (EX.l2, T.l46); (4) the statements (bills) from 
Dairymen to Gassner (EX.S & 6, T.l40); and (5) the testimony of Edw1n 1" 
Gossner, Jr. concerning the money tendered was based upon the state-
ments from Dairymen to Gassner. (T.l36.) 
The Respondents did not present one shread of evidence to contrad 
Appellant's showir:q of a valid security interest in this account rece:'l' 
able. The court, as a matter of law, should have found for the Appel· 
1 
lant. There were no facts in dispute on this question, and the cour: I 
erred in allowing this question to go to the jury. The court even re· 
fused to instruct the jury as requested by Appellant (R.l96) that as' 
I 
matter of law the Appellant had a valid and perfected security intereotl 
in all Of Dairymen's accounts including accounts receivable. The Ap:oi 
lant' s security agreement did, however, meet the requirements of CJt;:. 
Code Annotated 70A-9-204. There <,.;as an agreement (EX.ll) and valued 
given by Appellant (T.64-65); and Dairymen had rights in the colla:en: 
i.e.; the account. (EX.S & 6). Furthermore, the Appellant met the L' 
ing requirements of Utah Code Annotated 70A-9-401, 402 & 403. 
An account is defined in Utah Code Annotated 70A-9-ll6 as · ··; 
right to payment for goods sold ... " The Appellant also requesteJ ,. 
instruction on this def1nition •,.;hicb. •,.;as refused. (R.l97). Agair. t~' 
evidence is clear and not d1sputed that the 531,635.29 paid b7 thei· 
tiff was for milk delivered bj the Oalr .·mer C:ooperatl·;e to Gossner: 
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last 15 days of October and the first 15 days of November, 1975. 
(T.44;135-l36). Dairymen was entitled to payment for the goods it de-
l livered, and the Appellant by virtue of its security interest in Dairy-
~ men's accounts and Dairymen's default on its obligations to Appellant, 
is entitled to the $31,635.29 as a matter of law. 
The goods delivered to Gassner by Dairymen was 823,301 pounds of 
1 "Diverted and Transferred milk ..• " and 29,179 pounds of Diverted and 
Transferred Butterfat ... " (EX.5 & 6, T.45). Dairymen was entitled to 
payment for this milk and sent statements to Gassner. This is a classic 
':1 commercial accounts receivable. There is some testimony that the Res-
pondents shipped milk directly to Gessner in September, October and 
November, 1975, but there is no evidence whatsoever that any of their 
/ ~ilk was part of the milk delivered in October and November, 1975 by 
I Dairymen to Gessner, and for which he tendered this money. There was no 
~oney tendered by Gessner for milk delivered to him by the Respondents! 
(T.l36) . Any claim of the Respondents to this money must come through 
~eir judgments against Dairymen entered in Weber County on December 5, 
1975, and by virtue of their garnishments served on Gessner Cheese Co. 
The interest of the Respondents, if any, to this money, is subordi-
nate and inferior to the rights of the Appellant. The Appellant pro-
' perly ?erfected its security interest in Dairymen's accounts receivable 
bJ filing its financing statement (EX.l2) c.vith the Utah Secretary of 
State on February 21, 1975, as evidenced on the fact of Exhibit 12 (T.66) · 
In ilal'<er Sank and Trust Co. v. Smith, 501 P.2d 639 (Nevada 1972), 
•~ere t~e ~evada Supreme court recognized that the relevant provisions 
:t ~r~-~1~ 3 ~nder the ~tah and ~evada Commercial Codes were the same, 
-7-
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the court held that the financing statement filed by Walker Bank 
. . . I 
specifically granted to walker a secuo.ty ~nterest ~n accounts receiv-l 
I 
able. The court said that the statement which described the collateral! 
. I 
as "accounts receivable" adequately descr ~bed the debtors accounts for 1 
I 
the purpose of perfecting a security interest therein. The court~~ 
said that the financing statement was properly filed in the State of 
utah with the Secretary of State. Smith Construction was a lien crediJ 
and acquired its lien by attachment. The court said that "it is clear 
that a security interest which is perfected before one becomes a lien i 
I 
creditor enjoys a preferred position." ld. at 642. The Respondents in 
1 
this case were not even lien creditors. True, they had judgments agm1 
Dairymen and a garnish:nent had been served on Gessner Cheese Co. but no 
I 
garnishee judgment had been entered authorizing execution of the garn11 
ment. In fact, Gessner Cheese Co. owed no monies to Dairymen, and the 
garnishment was served on the wrong entity. Ever assuming the status 1
1 
of lien creditors, the Respondents claims to the money are inferior a,1 
subordinate as a matter of law. The Trial Court erred in not grantD; 
Appellant's Motion for a Directed Verdict or in not granting Appellar/ 
[lllotion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. This issue should ~,;j 
never gone to the jury and the Trial Court erred in allowing it to ce 
decided by the jury. The Appellant is entitled to a judg;nent in its 
favor as a matter of law, and respectfully requests this court ~ vK~ 
the judgment and award the $31,635.29 to the Appellant. 
POI:'JT IB 
THE FACT THAT RESPONDENTS ONLY CLA I~l TO THE 
MONEY TENDERED BY PLAINTIFF WAS THROUGH DIARY-
MEN ASSOCIATES, INC. IS RES JUDICATA, AND THE 
-8-
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:eiv- 1 
I 
I 
Iter all 
I 
'f I 
' or\ 
also 
of 
JUDGt--lENTS ENTERED IN WEBER COUNTY ARE 
BINDING BOTH AS TO THOSE ISSUES THAT 
WERE DECIDED AND TO THOSE ISSUES THAT 
COULD HAVE BEEN DECIDED. 
In November of 1975, the Respondents, in separate lawsuits, 
filed complaints in Weber County against Dairymen Associates, Inc. aka 
Heber Valley Milk Co. and Gassner Cheese Company (EX.l4 &28). The 
I Respondent, Orval E. Petersen alleged that Dairymen • ••• is indebted 
:redi~ 
to Plaintiff in the sum of $12,467.13 for milk purchased and delivered 
:lear 
i from Plaintiff to Defendant between September and November, 1975. • 
lien 
\ (EX.28). Likewise, the allegations of Respondent, E. Odell Summers, ex-
ts in 1 
but no 
I 
garn11 
d the 
atus I 
:llar,:' 
:o ce 
cept for the amount, are identical. (EX.l4). Both Respondents prayed 
for judgment against Dairymen for their respective amounts. 
In a Second Cause of Action, in Weber County, the Respondents al-
leged that Gossner Cheese Company "received the milk Plaintiff delivered 
~ Defendant Dairymen Associates, Inc." (emphasis added). The only re-
lief sought against Gessner Cheese Company was for a restraining order 
"against GOSSNER CHEESE COMPANY from delivering monies in the amount owed 
to the Plaintiff as and for milk delivered through Dairymen Associates, 
Inc." (EX .14 & 28) (emphasis added). 
Judgments by Default were taken by the Respondents against Dairymen 
on December 5, 1975. (EX.lS & 20). These Default Judgments were • ..• 
entered against said defendant in pursuance of the prayer of said com-
?laint." (EX.l5 & 20). The Respondents later by Stipulation and Order 
dismissed tjeir claim against Gassner Cheese Company with prejudice. 
I EX . l 7 & 31 ) • 
Respondents made no claims in Weber County against Edwin 0. Gessner 
~~ n1s lndlvidual capacity. Specifically there was no claim that these 
-9-
'til ,, 
'' :':! 
'I ,,
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Respondents were entitled to receive money directly from Edwin o. 
Gossner or Gossner Cheese Company. No allegations were made that 
there were contracts between these Respondents and Gessner, or that 
they delivered their milk directly to Gossner. 
At the trial in Box Elder County, however, the court, over Ap-
pellant's objections, (T.l46, 156) allowed the Respondents to testify 
that they had some kind of an agreement with Gessner whereby they de-
livered their milk directly to Gessner in September, October and Novem-', 
I 
ber, 1975, and were to be paid directly by Gessner. The Court also al-· 
I 
lowed them to testify that they terminated their agreements with Dairy-) 
I 
men. This testimony is completely contrary to their allegations in 
their complaints in Weber County and also in their answer filed in thi: 
I 
lawsuit. (R.34). The Trial Court erred in not granting Appellant's Ho·l 
tion for a Directed Verdict or for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdid 
The fact that the Respondents' only claim to the money tendered was 
through Dairymen, is res judicata, and the court as a matter of law, ( 
should have awarded the money to the Appellant because of Appellant's! 
prior perfected security interest. , 
The doctrine of res judicata was properly raised by the Appellan:.l 
I 
In East Millcreek Water Co. v. Salt Lake City, 159 P.2d 863 (Utah 1940,· 
as quoted in Wheadon v. Pearson, 376 P.2d 946 (Utah 1962), the utah 
Supreme Court lists the elements necessary for a defense of res judic'1 
in Utah. These elements are as follows: 
(1) it must be between the same parties or privies; 
(2) it applies only where the claim, demand, or cause 
of action is the same in both cases; and 
(3) the matter goes to final judgment, in other words, 
a judgment on the merits. 
When these elements have been met, the doctrine ~f res judicat 3 
following effects: 
-10- d 
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(1) it bars the successful party as well as the losing party 
of the previous suits; 
(2) it.applies not.only.to points and issues which are actually 
ra1sed and dec1ded 1n the previous suit, but also to all 
points and issues that were triable in the previous lawsuit; 
and 
(3) if one of the parties fails to raise any point or issue or 
fails to litigate any part of his claim, demand or cause of 
action, "such party may not again litigate that claim, de-
mand or cause of action, or any issue, point or part there-
of, which he could have but failed to litigate in the form-
er action." 
(See also Belliston v. Texaco, Inc. 521 P.2d 379 (Utah 1974). 
The Respondents, Summers and Petersen, each received judgment a-
gainst Dairymen Associates. They alleged in their complaints that 
Dairymen owed them money for milk they delivered to Dairymen and, the 
District Court in Weber County granted judgments on their allegations. 
It was error for the trial court in Box Elder County to totally ignore 
the Weber county Judgments. The facts decided in Weber County were 
res judicata and the trial court in Box Elder County was bound by 
those facts. 
All the elements of res judicata as set forth above are present 
in this case. The Appellant, Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives, by virtue 
of its security interest in Dairymen's accounts receivable is in privy 
with Dairymen within the meaning of privity as applied to res judicata. 
In Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957 (Utah 1943) I the utah supreme Court 
gave the following definition of privity as "a mutual or successive 
relationship to the same right or property. As applied to judgments 
or decrees of court, the word means one whose interest has been legally 
represented at the time." This definition is consistant with the mean-
i~g of privity applied in other jurisdictions. See, Dillard v. McKnight, 
-11-
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209 P. 2d 387 (Cal. Supp. 1949); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insuranc' 
company v. Salazar, 318 P.2d 210 (Cal. 1957); l'laitkus v. Pomeroy, SOo 
P.2d 392 (Colo. 1972). 
The key consideration to privity is that the party seeking the 
doctrine res judicata either as a defense or as a sword is not a strai i 
' to the previous action in that his legal interest was represented atj 
trial. The legal interest of the Appellant, Berkeley Bank, was repre· 
sented at the trial in that its position was that Dairymen did in fac~ 
owe this money to the Respondents, Summers and Petersen, for milk whiq 
had been delivered by Summers and Petersen to Dairymen Associates, th: 
fact was conclusi~ely established in Weber County. 
Furthermore, the Respondents filed suit against Gassner Cheese Cj 
but did not allege that they were owed money by Gassner Cheese Co. n c 
failed to name Edwin 0. Gassner in his individual capacity in that 1:• 
suit in Weber County. By failing to raise any claim against Gassner 
I 
Cheese Co. or Edwin 0. Gassner, the Respondents should not have be~~ 
lowed to again litigate that claim, demand or cause of action, or~. 
issue which they could have but failed to litigate in the former act:; 
in Weber County. The trial court by allowing the Respondents to ra1:l 
these issues in Box Elder County prejudiced the rights of the ;:<pSJell·l 
and the Appellant is in the position to rely on the facts conclusive. 
established in Weber County. 
The second test i.e. the same clai:n, demand or cause of action· 
also met. ~!any different tests have been established in ?arious jur:~ 
dictions to determine ·t~hat constitutes the same claim, denand or cau'·, 
of action. The Utah Case Law does however, specifica:Cl~·. 3do?t one''' 
-12-
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~ In re Town of West Jordan 326 P.2d 105 (Utah 1958), the Utah court 
5~ applied the test of whether the alleged rights of both actions accrued 
at the same time. The question before the court involved disconnection 
he of real property in West Jordan. The property owners had been involved 
strai in a previous disconnection suit with another City. The court held 
atj that res judicata did not apply because the rights involved in the two 
epre· actions did not accrue at the same time. 
~c~ The rights o£ the Respondents which were raised at the trial in 
~~ Box Elder County did accrue at the same time as the rights conclusively 
, th: established in Weber County. The Respondents claim to the monies in this 
trial are based upon rights which accrued in September, October and 
sec: November, 1975. It is the same milk for which they claimed in Weber 
n County they were entitled to be paid by Dairymen Associates, Inc. In 
ner 
I 
>een ·1 
an; 
act::: 
I 
r a1:l 
)ell· I 
this trial, however, they claimed that they were entitled to be paid 
directly by Gassner for the same milk! 
The final element, the fact there need be a final judgment on the 
merits is also met. The Trial Court in Box Elder County denied Ap-
pellant's Motion for a Directed Verdict on the ground that the previous 
l~wsuit resulted in a default judgment and that it had never been liti-
;ated on the merits. The general rule is that a default judgment is a 
:ive. final judgment on the merits for: the purposes of both res judicata and 
coll=.ter:al estoppel. Blache v. Blache, 160 P.2d 136 (California 1945); 
on· T~chnical Air: Products, Inc. v. Sheridan-Gray, Inc., 445 P.2d 426 (Ari-
jur:: zone. 1968); Tarnoff v. Jones, 497 P.2d 60 (Arizona. 1972); Kernan v. 
cau'·, ~' 359 ?.2d 431 (Nevade. 1962). 
-1"1-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Appellant successfully raised the doctrine of res judicata, 
and the trial court erred in not granting Appellant's Motion for Di-
cc 
pJ 
rected verdict and also erred in not granting Appellant's ' fc Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. j l The Respondents only claim~: 
L< 
the money was through Dairymen Associates and that fact was conclu- ; 
I tt 
sively established in Weber County. They should not have been allo~ 
to in Box Elder County say that that fact was not established and 
WE 
a: 
that they are entitled to receive their money directly from Gessner. 1 
ac 
They failed to raise any claim against Gessner in Weber County and 
' j l 
based upon the doctrine of res judicata, should have been barred frorr. 
g. 
raising that claim in Box Elder County. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled in several recent cases that ii, 
! 
a! 
I C. 
parties have had an opportunity to present their case and judgment i:i 
j I 
rendered thereon, it is binding both as to those issues that were 
tried and to those that were triable in that proceeding and the parLI 
are precluded from further litigating the matter. 
Texaco, Inc., 521 P.2d 379 (Utah 197 4) , the Utah 
that where the opportunity does exist to raise a 
is not raised, that claim can not be relitigated 
The Court's decision indicated that this is true 
In Belliston v. 
Supreme Court held I 
claim and that clai~l 
in a separate trial.[ 
even if the former I 
decision had not been on the merits. 
tiffs filed an action in 
In the Belliston case the plal··t 
District Court in 1967 againas
11
te: .• [ 
In the first count plaintiffs 
the Federal 
Texaco, Inc. stating two counts. 
that Texaco had committed three violations of the Sherman Act. In t:l 
o• 
i• 
Ji 
t. 
' . ' __ [ 
second count, Texaco was alleged to have engaged in price d1scnml~: .j J 
tion. The jury awarded damages to the ;?lain tiff on each count, tn"' · G 
-u-
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court of Appeals reversed the judgment on both counts. Thereafter the 
at a, 
Di-
plaintiffs initiated in the State Court an action to recover damages 
' for unlawful price discrimination under Utah Law which law except for 
1 for 
jurisdictional requirements is substantially similar for the Federal 
Law. The plaintiffs conceded that the substance of the state statute, 
Lu- ; 
1 the nature of their claim, and the type and the amount of proof required 
LlowEi 
were sufficiently similar to those same elements under the federal act 
as to raise the bar of res judicata, if the decision in the fede~al 
1er. ' 
action had been on the merits rather than a dismissal for lack of federal 
, jurisdiction. The Utah Court then cited Wheadon v. Pearson, 376 P.2d 
frorr. 
:lt ii 
1t jo1 
.! 
JarLI 
J. 
:d I 
:lai~l 
rial.[ 
ner I 
:::i·t 
:~lle:l 
In t: I 
nino·[ 
that J 
946 (Utah 1962), for the proposition that the doctrine of res judicata 
applies not only to points and issues which were actually raised and de-
cided in a prior action but also as to those that could have been ad-
judicated. 
It is important to note that the Supreme Court made this ruling 
even though in the Federal Court it was held that the Court did not have 
jurisdiction and that there had been no adjudication by the Court or 
Jury on plaintiff's claim of price discrimination. As to this argument 
the court said: 
"This argument does not resolve the matter, for the issue is whether 
s~e state claim should have been asserted in the Federal action, so 
that the parties were precluded from relitigating L~e claim. The re-
solution of this issue is contingent on whether the Federal Court had 
the ;:ower to hear this state claim in judicial proceeding before it." 
S2l at 380. 
The Respondents had an opportunity in the Weber County cases to 
~ile a claim against Edwin 0. Gassner and to allege an agreement or an 
~nderstanding wherein these Respondents were to be paid directly by ~r. 
Gassner for any mil~ they delivered directly to Gassner. Having failed 
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to raise this claim and having claimed that the money was owed to th~ 
by Dairymen Associates by virtue of their delivering the milk to Da~ 
I 
men Associates, they are precluded from raising this claim in a su~ 
sequent proceeding. It should be noted that no claim has ever been~ 
by these defendants against Gessner in his individual capacity. In fac:1 
I 
its interpleader action the Respondents did not make a claim against: 
Gessner, having filed no counterclaim against Gessner. The Responden1 
have agreed with Gessner that Gessner owed the money to Dairymen 
I 
Associates and not to these defendants because the Respondents dismid 
I 
with prejudice any claim they had against Gessner in the Stipulation 
entered into in Weber County (EX.l7 & 31). 
In summary of this ?Oint the case of Wheadon v. Pearson, Supra,: 
I, 
should be noted. The Utah Supreme Court held that where the plaintitl 
! 
had once attempted to obtain his entire release, based on his entire! 
claim, the matter should be laid at rest and the plaintiff should be 
denied a second attempt at substantially the same objective under 
different set of facts. The Court cited East Millcreek Hater Co. v. 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 159 P.2d 863 (Utah 1945 ): 
"In such case the oourts hold that the parties should litigate their 
entire claim, demand and cause of action and every part, issue and 
ground thereof ..• " 
POINT IC 
THE RESPONDENTS ARE COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED 
TO DENY THAT THEIR ONLY CLAHI TO THE MONEY 
WAS THROUGH DAIRYMEN ASSOCIATES, INC. BY 
VIRTUE OF THEIR PREVIOUS JUDGMENTS IN HEBER 
COUNTY. 
The case of Bernhard v. The Bank of .Z\merica, 122 P.2d 892 (19~: 
the California Supreme Court, is one of the leadlng cases o~ res 
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th~ and collateral estoppel. This case held that "mutuality of estoppel" 
lai11 is not required· In other words, an estoppel may be raised defensively 
ili- by one not a party in a prior suit against one who was a party in that 
!n r~ suit. This concept has come to be known as collateral estoppel. It 
fac:, is broader than res judicata in that it applies to a cause of action 
I 
1st: different from that involved in the original action. It is an answer, 
tdenl however, in that it does not apply to matters which could have been 
litigated but were not. 
I 
~d The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized this distinction bet-
1 
on ween res judicata and collateral estoppel. In Richards v. Hodsen, 485 
~I i 
tifj 
! 
re ! 
be 
v. 
P.2d 1044 (1971), the Court stated: 
"Since the plaintiffs herein were not parties to the former action 
between defendants herein and the purchasers, they would not be 
bound by any ruling made against the purchasers in the first case •••• 
The defendants here were parties to the prior 3Ction and litigated 
fully their claim... They have had their day in court. They have 
tried that issue and now atte~t to retry it. (Collateral Estoppel) 
differs from res judicata not only in the fact that all parties need 
not be the same in the two actions, but also in the fact that the 
estoppel applies only to issues actually litigated and not to those 
which could have been determined." 
The Appellant, Berkeley Bank, is arguing in the alternative that 
the defense of collateral estoppel was raised. The Appellant is not 
abandoning its claim of res judicata or its claim that the Appellants 
legal insterest was represented at the trial in Weber County. If, 
however, the court does not find that the Appellant was in privity with 
the defendant, Dairymen Associates in Weber County, then the defense of 
collateral estoppel is still applicable. The Respondents are estopped as 
to those issues actually litigated in the previous suit i.e. that their 
J~ :la1m that ~o~ey for milk delivered in September, October and November, 
:973 was owed to them by Dairymen Associates, Inc. and not by Gossner 
-l 7- ------------------------------------------
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nor Gessner Cheese Co. The issue of who Summers and Petersen would b 
collect their money from was litigated and conclusively decided in 
1 
I 
Weber County. Had Dairymen Associates been solvent then the judgmenti 
I 
could have been executed upon and the Respondents would have received! C 
I 
their money. Respondents should not have been allowed to come into i m 
the trial in Box Elder County and additionally claim that they were 
entitled to monies owed by Gassner to Dairymen Associates. Their onl.: B 
claim to the money had been conclusively established, and the Respon-1 ::: 
! ' dents are collaterally estopped to deny that Dairymen owed them the I 1 
money .Closely related to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel, is the fact that Respondents elected their remedy by taking' u 
judgments against Dairymen. The judgments taken by the Respondents I a 
in Weber County were discharged, as a matter of law, in the Bankruptc: 
c Court at the time Dairymen filed bankruptcy in January, 1976. The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that when a judgment becomes discharg~r~ 1 
Bankruptcy and a party has elected to take its judgment, the party h: U 
elected its remedy and is bound by the judgment rendered therein botl 
as to the issues tried and those issues which are triable and the pad I 
is precluded from further litigating the matter. National Finance c:l 
I 
of Provo v. Daley, 14 Utah 2d 263, 382 P.2d 405 (1963). j r 
The Respondents' judgments were discharged in bankruptcy and ~!1 P 
Respondents' having elected their remedy to sue Dairymen Associates . 
must abide by that decision, even though it resulted in a judgment 'lf-l " 
has been discharged in bankruptcy. Suppose, for example, that the I 1 
$31 000 00 d b G · · h d t been d1·sc!0-1. . , . owe y ossner To Da1rymen Assoc1ates a no 
1 
in the Bankruptcy Court. The Respondents would be tnecluded by the 
I 
-18-
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ld by the Bankruptcy Court, under the Utah Law, from asserting the theory 
n 
1 
that they were entitled to receive their money directly from Gossner. 
I 
menti (The same theory they asserted in Box Elder County). The Bankruptcy 
I ivedl court would have held under Utah Law that the judgments against Dairy-
1 
to i men would have been their remedy and they would not have been entitled 
re to any monies from Gassner. This point is well established in the Utah 
onl:' Bankruptcy Court and is based upon this case of National Finance Company 
[?On· I 
! 
he 1 
eral 
v. Daley, Supra. The Court in Daley said that the critical question of 
importance was whether, in determining dischargeability of a judgment, 
the court should look only to the judgment and the record of the case 
king' upon which it is based, or whether it should go back to the judgment 
:s 
and examine issues not raised in that proceeding. The Utah Supreme Court 
took the position that the Court could look behind the judgment, but 
could not go beyond the record and examine into matters not litigated 
1n the action. The Bankruptcy Court in the Federal District Court of 
Utah has held that this law is applicable even though the record amounts 
to a complaint and a default judgment. Zions lst National Bank v. 
Irving, No. B-74-550, December 1, 1976, United States Bankruptcy Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Daley also again cited the generally 
recognized rule of procedure that where the parties have had the op-
~ortunity to present their case and judgment is rendered it becomes 
binding upon them, both as to the issues that were tried and those that 
were triable in that proceeding, and that they are precluded from further 
I litigating the :natter. The Court then said: 
"In our Judgment it better comports with the orderly processe: of 
justice to require L~e plaintiff to bear the respons1b1l1ty o: plead-
ing, ;xovi:1g and clai:ning the full benefit of '.vhatever _ch~r~cter or 
cause of action he ?QSSesses in the or1ginal act1on and or oe1ng 
-19-
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bound thereby, then to allow another trial~ upon the same cause of 
action raising issues which could have been dealt wi~ ·in the 
original action." This rule also serves the purpose of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and at the same time leaves the way open to guard against 
the discharge of debts of the character excepted from discharge if 
the facts so justify. 283 P.2d at 407 (emphasis added). 
The Respondents had their day in court and must bear the respons) 
bility of their election. They should not have been allowed to pr~: 
judice the rights of the Appellant to a legitimate claim against o~d 
men Associates based on its perfected security interest in Dairymen's 
I 
accounts receivable. If these Respondents would not be entitled~~ 
claim in the Bankruptcy Court upon their theory at the trial then ~J 
I 
should not be entitled to a claim as allowed by the trial court in th:l 
case. The trial court committed error in refusing to grant the Appel; 
lant 1 s Motion for a Directed Verdict and the Appellant respectively I 
asks this court to reverse the judgment of the court below and enter' 
judgment in favor of the Appellant as a matter of law. 
POINT ID 
NEITHER OF THE RESPONDENTS !<lET THEIR BUR-
DENS OF PROOF THAT THE MONEY TENDERED BY 
THE PLAINTIFF OR ANY PORTION THEREOF, WAS 
MONEY OWED THEM FOR ANY MILK THEY DELIVERED 
TO GOSSNER. 
Both the Appellant and the Respondents assert a claim to the 
monies tendered by the plaintiff, Edwin 0. Gossner. I I The Appellants I 
claim to the money was based upon its perfected security interest in 
Dairymen 1 s accounts receivable, and that the money tendered into couc:l 
I 
I 
by the plaintiff, was money owed by the plaintiff to oair:;men ,;ssocJ::. 
Inc· and was therefore an accounts receivable of Dairymen. The Res?c· 
dents initial claims to the money were based on their Judgments agai:.s: 
-20-
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onsJ 
e- : 
aid 
n's 
oairymen and on a garnishment served on Gessner Cheese Co. At the 
trial, however, they claimed that they were entitled to the monies 
by virtue of having delivered milk in the months of September, Octo-
ber and November, 1975 directly to Edwin 0. Gessner, and that Edwin 
o. Gossner agreed to pay money to them for milk so delivered. At the 
outset of the trial the court instructed the parties as to their re-
' spective burdens of proof. The Respondents were instructed by the 
o a 
Judge that they had the burden of proving an agreement existed bet- ~ 
the: I 
ween themselves and Gessner. They also had the burden of proving 
th:l 
that the monies tendered into court by the plaintiff were monies owed 
to them by virtue of having delivered milk directly to the plaintiff. 
The Respondents failed to meet their burdens of proof and the 
Appellant, after the Respondents had rested, moved for directed ver-
~ict in Appellant's favor on the basis that the Respondents had failed 
to meet their burdens of proof- (T. 207). 
The Appellant introduced evidence which indicated that Dairymen 
sent statements to Gossner for milk delivered in October and November, 
1975. (EX. 5 & 6). These statements were for milk delivered to Gossner 
,, I by Dairymen Associates for the last 15 days of October and the first 
-I 15 days of November, 1975. (T.44). This evidence was not contradicted 
in 
3i:.31 
I 
by the Respondents. Exhibit 6 shows the amount of milk delivered for 
October, 1975 at 502,162 pounds of diverted and transferred milk at 
$6.65 plus 17,874 pounds of diverted and transferred butterfat at 60¢. 
Exhibit 5 shows that for the month of November, Gossner was billed for 
delivery of 321,139 pounds of diverted and transferred milk at S6.65 
-21-
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and 11,305 pounds of diverted and transferred butterfat at 60¢. so 
between october 15th and November 15th, Gossner received from Dairy- i 
I 
I men, 823,301 pounds of diverted and transferred milk for a total owea
1 
I 
by Gossner to Dairymen of $54,749.51. In addition, Gossner also r~ 
ceived from Dairymen in this same period, 29,179 pounds of diverted 
and transferred butterfat for a total owing by Gessner to Dairymen 
$17,507.40. It is important to note that these statements do not re·l 
present any milk delivered in September or the first part of October,
1 
1975. The Appellant also presented testimony that the amount tenderecl 
into court by the plaintiff is based on these two statements. {T.l36). 
Furthermore, Mr. Gossner testified that no money was tendered into th 
court for milk which was delivered directly by the Respondents to 
Gessner. He testified that if money was owed to the Respondents it 
1 
I 
would not be paid to Dairymen Associates. {T.l32, 140-141). This testj 
mony is consistant with fact that Gessner had advanced $39,500.00 whd 
was deducted from the amount owed in the October statement. {EX.6).j 
indicated in the Complaint filed by the plaintiff, the money was tende:~ 
into the Court by plaintiff because he owed the money to 
Associates and because Gessner was served with a l'lrit of 
wherein Summers and Peterson claimed they were entitled 
I 
Dairymen's ! 
I 
I 
Granishment j 
to a portior.:l 
this money by virtue of their judgments entered against Dairymen's ir 
Weber County. {R.04-05). There is no evidence in the record to the I 
contrary. 
The Respondents both testified that they instructed the milk h,;.l 
George Thornley, to deliver their milk directlj to l·lr. Gessner besi.",:.i 
-22-
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sometime in July of 1975. This testimony contradicts the testimony 
~ given in their deposition, wherein they both indicated that during 
.r~~ most all of 1975, the milk was picked up and delivered the same way 
I ow~ that it had been done in the previous part of 1975. They also ad-
r~, mitted that they continued to look to D~irymen Associates to be paid. 
:ed (T.83,84;181,184). The Respondents were unable to introduce any evi-
•n dence which indicated that they had reached an agreement with Gassner 
re·l whereby Gessner agreed to pay them for milk which they had directly 
•ber,j delivered to him. Both Summers and Peterson indicated that they had 
dH~ talked with Mr. Gessner, but Mr. Gessner was not produced and did not 
136). testify at the trial. Any evidence concerning what he said or may have 
o ~ said to the Respondents was hearsay. The Court properly sustained the 
Appellant's objection on two occasions. (T.l65,193-194). The Court did, 
it ! however, refuse to sustain the Appellant's objection as to hearsay evi-
I 
testj 
whd 
dence on page 79 of the transcript which the Appellant asserts as error 
on the part of the Trial Court. Aside from this hearsay testimony, the 
).j Respondents failed to meet their burden of proving that there was an 
ende:~ agreement between themselves and Gessner. In fact, Mr. Summers testi-
i 
I 5 ! 
I 
I 
ent j 
fied that he was paid by Dairymen for all of 1975 (T.83) and that he 
was never paid by Gassner in 1975. (T. 84). In fact, the milk tickets 
imJ which were introduced as Exhibit 32 at the trial were on Dairymen milk 
s ~ tickets. Mr. Peterson testified that he had no agreement with Gessner 
he I (T.l98) and that he was never a Gassner producer until after November, 
1975. (T.l77). 
h,;.l On several occasions the Appellant's counsel asked both of the 
Respondents how many pounds of milk they had delivered for the months 
-23-
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of September, October and November, 1975. In each instance, the 
Respondents were unable to say how many pounds of milk were actual~ 
delivered. Mr. Peterson came the closest by saying that approxim~~ 
75,000 pounds of milk was delivered in October, but he did not have* 
documentary evidence to prove this statement. It is interesting ~ 
I 
note that over 500,000 pounds of milk was delivered to Gessner in th<i 
month of October and Mr. Peterson admits that he did not account for aj 1: 
of Gessner's milk. (T.l87,197). Furthermore, a tabulation of the mil,' 
receipts introduced by Mr. Summers shows a total of only 51,217 pounc.l' E 
of milk which is somewhat less than the 800,000 pounds of milk ac~~ 
received by 11r. Gessner. Even assuming that there is a claim by the.· 
Respondents against Gessner, there is not any evidence to prove that 
their claim is tied directly to the money tendered into Court by the 
plaintiff. 
I 
It is obvious that the only claim Respondents have to the mon~l 
tendered into Court was through their judgments against Dairymen Ass) 
I 
I 
ciates in Weber County. All of the evidence concerning the terminat.l 
of their agreements with Dairymen and their refusal to sign certain~ 
which Berkeley requested as security for the principal loan is immat;:i 
The Respondents' burden was clear. They failed to meet their burder<J 
the Trial Court erred in failing to grant Appellant's :'-lotion for aD:· 
rected Verdict at the close of the evidence. The Appellant, on the:) 
hand, did meet its burden of proving as a matter of law that the 
money tendered into Court was money owed to Dairymen and was an acco:: 
receivable of Dairymen. There is no evidence in the record to the ,c-
trary. The Appellant respectfully requests that the judgment beloVI :e, 
reversed and that t:-'1e .J..ppellant be 3w2rded t:--te monej as a matter JC -· 
-2~-
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late:~ 
IVe 4 
to 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING CERTAIN TESTIMONY AND IN 
FAILING TO GIVE REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS OF THE APPELLANT, AND 
THE APPELLANT IS, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The Appellant is entitled to a new trial for any one of the fol-
lowing reasons: 
1. The Trial Court erred in allowing testimony as to issues which 
h' were res judicata, and allowing issues not raised by the pleadings to I t Ej 
or aj be tried over Appellant's objection; 
mil•' 2. The Trial Court erred in allowing hearsay evidence as to what 
ouncj' 
tual 
Edwin 0. Gessner allegedly said to the Respondents; 
3. The Trial Court erred in giving instruction #7 and in failing 
the, to give proposed instructions of Appellant concerning definition of a 
hat security agreement (R.l94), an account (R.l97) and concerning Res-
the [lOndents' burden of proof. (R.203,204,205); and 
4. The evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict. The 
grounds for a new trial are outlined in Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a 
party to join a Motion for a New Trial in its Motion for a Judgment 
~otwithstanding the verdict. The Trial Court committed error in fail-
nat;:i ing to grant Appellant's Motion for a New Trial. The Appellant's argu-
Jer<J ments as to the specific grounds are set forth as follows: 
1. The Trial Court erred in allowing testimony as to issues which 
were res judicata, and in allowing issues not raised by the pleadings to 
be tried over Appellant's objections. 
,co:: The Appellant's counsel, at page 146 of the transcript, moved the 
~- Court to strike the testimony of Mr. Summers concerning termination of 
the agreement with oairymen Associates, Inc., and to strike evidence 
f _,,,, ~hi:n1ng that ~lr. Gessner owed hi;n the money directly· _;; continuing 
0b]ect 1 on as to any further testimony coming in through either Mr. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contai  errors.
Peterson or Mr. Summers was also made by the Appellant. (T.l56). Thi' 
law of res judicata and collateral estoppel are set forth in Points 
IB and IC of Appellant's Brief. There is no need to set forth the 
law again in this point, except to say that the fact that the Res-
pondents looked to Dairymen for payment had been conclusively est~-
f lished in Weber County and to allow testimony beyond that was error. I 
The testimony which was allowed to stand and to come in at a later tij 
through Mr. Peterson and again through Jl.!r. Summers went beyond the fac\ 
I 
which had been conclusively established in Weber County. It was but 
upon this evidence that the jury awarded the Verdict to the Responden· 
(R.229,230). Even though there was insufficient evidence on this ~0 
the jury found that the ;noney was owed by Mr. Gessner directly to the 
Respondents and that the Respondents had delivered their milk dir~~ 
to Gessner. Furthermore, the jury found that the Respondents had ter] 
nated their agreement with Diarymen Associates. The evidence was in·j 
sufficient to justify this verdict, but even assuming that there was I 
I 
I 
sufficient evidence to justify the verdict, the Trial Court should r.c:i 
have allowed that testimony to go to the jury. I 
The Appellant also objected to this testimony on the basis ~M~ 
was beyond the pleadings filed by the Respondents. The Answer fil~~ 
the Respondents indicated a claim to the money by virtue of their ju:· 
ment in Weber County and by virtue of the garnishment which had beer 
served upon Gessner Cheese Company. In addition, they had dismiss~ 
Gessner with prejudice and had released him from any liability to pa: 
any money in this law suit. (T.lS0-151, 153-154). The Court found t::: 
the original pleadings •,;ere different from the theory which the Res· 
pondents asserted at trial in Box Elder countJ. (T.l55). It was er:c: 
-26-
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for the Court to allow this testimony on the basis of the grounds 
asserted, i.e., that the issues were res judicata or the Respondents 
were collaterally estopped to raise these issues and that the issues 
were not raised by the pleadings. 
2. The Trial Court also erred in allowing hearsay evidence as 
to what Edwin o. Gossner allegedly said to the Respondents. 
When Mr. Summers was testifying, he was asked whether or not he 
contacted Mr. Gassner in regard to payment of the amounts due him for 
milk delivered in September, October and November, 1975. (T.79). Mr. 
Summers answered the question "yes" and then was asked by Mr. Dorius 
the following question: "What did Mr. Gossner tell you in regards to 
paying you for this milk?" The Appellant's attorney objected on the 
grounds that evidence of what Mr. Gossner said coming through Mr. 
Summers would be hearsay. Mr. Dorius stated that Mr. Gossner was a 
party to the action and would be a witness. The Court allowed the 
testimony. (T.79). Mr. Gossner was never called to testify at the trial 
and it is obvious from looking at the Verdict that the jury relied upon 
the inuendoes made by Summers and Peterson that Gassner had told them 
that he owed them the money directly. There is no other evidence which 
would account for their finding. The Trial Court committed an error in 
allowing this testimony. In fact, on two separate occasions the Court 
sustained a similar objection made by the Appellant. (T.l65 & T.l93-l94) · 
3. The Trial Court erred in giving Instruction #7 and in failing 
to give proposed instructions of the Appellant concerning the definition 
of a security agreement (R.l94), an account (R.l97), and concerning Res-
iJOndent's burden of proof. (R.203,204,&205) · 
-27-
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The Instruction #7 contains the theories of both the Appellant 
and the Respondent. The instruction to the jury as to the Respondent· 
theory as stated, however, was an error. The question of whether orl 
not the Respondents, prior to September 1, had terminated any associa· 
tion with Dairymen Associates, Inc. was totally immaterial to the 
issues. The question of termination of a contract is a question of 11 
and there was no evidence upon which to conclude that the contract wa:' 
terminated. The only self serving statements were made by the Respor.- 1 
dents that they thought they had terminated their agreement. Even 1: 
they had terminated their agreement, that fact was not material to tr.' 
issue of whether or not they were entitled to receive money directly' 
from Mr. Gessner for milk they delivered during the months of Septe~J~ 
October and November, 1975. This instruction led the jury to believE 
that if they found there was a termination then they were also to fir: 
that they were to be paid directly by Gessner. To give the jury the I 
and the I impression that one necessarily follows the other was error 
Court committed error in giving Instruction #7. 
The Court also failed to give Appellant's proposed instructions 
concerning the definition of a security agreement. (R.l94). This io 
simple definition of a security agreement based upon the law of the , 
State of Utah and was critical to the Appellant's theory of the case. 
The Court further refused to give ;?roposed instruction found at R.l~ 
concer:ning the definition of an account •.vhich is taken from the comm'"·l 
under Article 9 of the Utah Commercial Code. The Court further fall': 1 
give instructions found at R.203, 204 & 205, concerning the burden 2 
proof of the Respondents. By failing to Jive the jury some instrL•C> 
-28-
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as to what the Respondents were required to prove taken together 
~ with Instruction #7, the Court did not adequately instruct the jury. 
1 The question of whether the Respondents terminated their agreements 
with Dairymen was totally immaterial. They either did or did not 
, have an agreement with Mr. Gessner, and the money tendered into 
r 
1• court was either owed to them directly or it was not. The critical 1 
~ question is, as set forth in the proposed instructions on Respondents' 
Burden of Proof, is whether or not the amount tendered included any 
money owed to Respondents by Gessner. The jury should have been in-
structed on this critical question, and the Respondents' burden of 
proving it. 
CONCLUSION 
This case should not have been allowed to go to the jury. The 
Appellant had met its burden of proving that the money tendered into 
court was, in fact, an accounts receivable of Dairymen's Associates. 
The Respondents failed to meet their respective burden of proof with 
respect to tying in any claim to the money tendered into court by the 
?laintiff. The Appellant, based upon the grounds asserted in this 
orief, respectfully ask this court to reverse the judgment entered in 
' Box Elder County and award the $31,635.29 to the Appellant as a matter 
of law. In addition, the evidence presented by the respondents was in-
sufficient to justify the verdict and the Appellant, in the alternative, 
therefore requests this court to grant a new trial on this ground or 
~pan other grounds which have been asserted by the Appellant. 
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W. CLARK BURT 
Attorney for Appellant, Berkeley 
Bank for Cooperatives 
Suite BOO Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
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